I grew up not when Vietnam was happening, but rather, I grew up in the dramatic artistic, historical and cultural shadow of the Vietnam era. That shadow colored much of what I did and what I valued, especially during the formative years of college where I was forming my world view and sharpening my military instincts.
While in the Marines, Vietnam loomed as the most important historical, cultural, and tactical benchmark. We all felt that it was the closest "real war," and although we valued those who had shot or been shot at at various time since such as GWI, Somalia, Liberia, etc. we kept real heroic thoughts for those who fought in Vietnam and (of course) in Korea and WWII.
After I saw the tiny bit of combat that I did see "liberals" (as I used to call what now I call "us") were adamant that Iraq was going to become the Vietnam of our generation. I discounted that notion then. But have been revisiting it mentally lately. I will have to write in more detail about this at some other point, but it seems to me that the shadow of Vietnam has created another Vietnam. In other words it is the fear of being judged as harshly as history judges Vietnam which created the policy conditions that set us on the path we currently find ourselves.
One small snippet (there are others) which I use only to illustrate my line of thinking: much of the historical rhetoric on Vietnam has held that the civilians in DC kept too tight a leash on Westmoreland and as they constantly ratchetted up and down the military strategy the folks on the ground (both Vietnamese and US) were not able to adapt quickly enough and the changes in military strategy were never allowed to develop before they were changed again. The lesson which I was taught more times than I can count is that if only the politicians had listened to the generals then things wouldn't have been messed up long term. That lesson is good, but when taken to an extreme, maybe not. Now we have conditions established that essentially mandate that when a general speaks no one should even question him. Generals are inspired, intelligent, sophisticated technocrats. They are not generalists. Their focus is not wide-spectrum policies. Even if they have interests in that realm, it isn't usually their job (random king-like post-WWII occurrences aside). They are & should be focussed on winning the battle on the ground. The completely myopic focus from day negative one until today on "winning" in Iraq and how that can be done militarily has created a policy environment where state institution building has taken a second- third- or fourth-seat at conference tables which synchronize US policy. Many are only NOW beginning to argue (although I remember thinking unsophisticated versions of this thought when I was in Baghdad afterglowing from pulling down the statute) that it is precisely this lack of focus on domestic political and bureaucratic institutions that is widely responsible for the ongoing violence in Iraq.
There is more here, but between trying to move, trying to move to Somalia, applying for the bar, finishing up my spring semester, and trying to look good for my lady I do not have time to fully explore this, but if I expanded it into a book I would title it: Misguided by History: The Lessons NeoCons Learned Wrongly from Vietnam.
Before leaving, I need to point out that I am heartily uncomfortable with the Sunni Awakening as a policy measure. When Big-Perm first told me that about it and how it had been the focus of his civil affairs work in the second half of 2007 in Anbar I was concerned. The more I read about it, the more my concern grows. My concerns essentially hinge on the US arming and empowering those who have very little stake in keeping a cohesive state. For instance, from the article above:
The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20 percent of every payment to a former insurgent -- which means that commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hundred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief.
Whenever we do decide to leave, if those incentives still exist then chaos at a maximum and violence at a minimum will be a direct result of our short-sided efforts to reduce US casaulties. What needs to happen is that we need to take away the incentives to breed chaos and violence. I'm not sure how that happens, but that is a question for Ambassador Cocker, not for the widely regarded General Petraeus.
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